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The purpose of this paper is to analyze and discuss the coordination of fiscal and monetary policies
in EMU. In section 2, we develop a framework for studying monetary and  fiscal policy in a
monetary union to explore the implications of the common currency for policy coordination. We
show that there is little need for coordinating monetary and fiscal policies in the long run. In section
3, we study the interaction of monetary and fiscal policies  in the short run. A monetary policy
firmly committed to price stability at the EMU level implies that the central bank controls aggregate
output at the euro-area level, while national fiscal policies determine the distribution of aggregate
demand across the participating countries.  Thus, national governments are engaged in a purely
distributional game with inefficient outcomes unless policies are coordinated. If monetary policy
also pursues a goal of output  stabilization, policy coordination should include the central bank
together with the fiscal authorities. We also show that the proposal to restrict fiscal policies to the
operation automatic stabilizers at the national level, which is now often made in EMU, does not
solve the issue of policy coordination. Instead, it worsens the situation of the central bank unless
automatic stabilizers are identical in all member economies. In section 4, we review the existing
mechanisms for policy coordination and show that they are deficient, since they focus on the long
run rather than the short run and largely ignore the interdependence of national economic policies
and the ECB’s monetary policy. Section 5 concludes.
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The beginning of the Third Stage of Economic and Monetary Union in Europe (EMU for 
short) has changed the quality of economic policy making of the member states. In the 
integrated monetary and financial market system created by the euro and the Euro-system 
(the European Central Bank and the national central banks of the countries participating in 
EMU), all participating member states share the benefits – or suffer from the lack – of a well-
conceived “single” monetary policy. Price stability is the key example. Since the price level is 
properly defined only for the entire domain of a currency, all euro area member states 
together either enjoy price stability or suffer from inflation.
1 Similarly, the welfare benefits of 
low currency risk (reflected in the common level of long-term interest rates), external balance 
(reflected in the level and variability of the exchange rate of the euro against other 
currencies,) and the stability of the EMU banking sector and financial markets (reflected in 
efficient and stable financial intermediation) accrue to all member states jointly. 
The euro area member states have delegated the authority over monetary policy to a 
common, supranational institution, the European Central Bank (ECB). Other, important parts 
of economic policy, however, continue to be decided at the national level, even if they have 
welfare effects for other member states, because they affect price stability, financial stability, 
or the EMU’s external balance directly or indirectly through the ECB’s reaction to national 
economic policies. EMU thus creates new and amplifies existing externalities of economic 
policies among the member states. Furthermore, EMU weakens the incentives for 
governments to consider the consequences of their national economic policies for price 
stability, financial stability and external balance, i.e., it invites free-riding behavior, because 
the benefits from policies aiming at these variables partly fall on other member governments 
in EMU.
2 The interdependence between the ECB’s monetary policy and national economic 
policies and the existence of externalities and free-riding incentives in EMU imply that non-
cooperative national economic policies and ECB monetary policy do not yield efficient policy 
outcomes in EMU.   
A number of papers explore the free rider behaviour in a monetary union (Dixit and 
Lambertini 1999, 2001; Beetsma and Bovenberg, 2001; Uhlig, 2002). In a similar setting Buti, 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
1 Individual countries can experience price developments that differ from the average inflation rate in 
the euro area. However, such differential developments must be properly interpreted as regional   
relative price movements, which cannot be the subject of EMU monetary policy. 
2 Recognition of this problem with regard to the level of public sector debts and deficits has been the 
justification for the Excessive Deficit Procedure of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth 
Pact.  2
Roeger and int’Velt (2001) model analyze cooperation among fiscal authorities in the 
presence of symmetric shocks. They find that cooperation is desirable especially if the euro 
economy is hit by a supply shock. Andersen (2002) shows that, in the case of a common 
shock, the inefficiency of non-cooperation is increasing in the number of member countries, 
whereas it is decreasing in the case of idiosyncratic shocks.  
There are two basic channels through which national economic policies affect the 
aggregate EMU variables. The first, obvious one is that some national policies directly affect 
the relevant euro area aggregates. To the extent that the ECB takes euro area wide 
economic growth into consideration when setting its monetary policy, national policies 
affecting these variables are also relevant.
3 This regards primarily public spending and 
taxation, but goes beyond budget deficits, as the level and the structure of public sector 
revenues and expenditures have important macro effects on growth, employment, and 
prices.   
The second channel works through national economic structures that shape the 
environment in which ECB monetary policy operates. For example, structural changes 
affecting the slope of the Phillips curve or the NAIRU in an individual member economy will 
change the constraints the ECB faces for its low-inflation policy, as the long-run equilibrium 
inflation rate of the euro area depends on such parameters.
4 Again, the reduced impact of 
national policies on price stability in EMU implies a reduced incentive for governments to 
undertake policies that could improve the monetary policy environment.
5  
The purpose of this paper is to analyze and discuss the coordination of fiscal and 
monetary policies in EMU. In section 2, we develop a framework for studying monetary and 
fiscal policy in a monetary union to explore the implications of the common currency for 
policy coordination. We show that there is little need for coordinating monetary and fiscal 
policies in the long run. In section 3, we study the interaction of monetary and fiscal policies 
in the short run. A monetary policy firmly committed to price stability at the EMU level implies 
that the central bank controls aggregate output at the euro-area level, while national fiscal 
policies determine the distribution of aggregate demand across the participating countries. 
Thus, national governments are engaged in a purely distributional game with inefficient 
outcomes unless policies are coordinated. If monetary policy also pursues a goal of output 
stabilization, policy coordination should include the central bank together with the fiscal 
authorities. We also show that the proposal to restrict fiscal policies to the operation of 
                                                  
3 Although the ECB’s main goal is price stability, it has a wider mandate of pursuing the general 
economic policies in the community provided that price stability is not endangered. Furthermore, the 
policy statements of the ECB clearly reflect a concern with cyclical developments in the euro area.  
4 This is the main tenet of models of monetary policy based on credibility arguments, e.g. Barro and 
Gordon (1983). 
5 See e.g. Sibert and Sutherland (2000), Calmfors (2001) and von Hagen (1999a).    3
automatic stabilizers at the national level, which is now often made in EMU, does not solve 
the issue of policy coordination. Instead, it worsens the situation of the central bank unless 
automatic stabilizers are identical in all member economies. In section 4, we review the 
existing mechanisms for policy coordination and show that they are deficient, since they 
focus on the long run rather than the short run and largely ignore the interdependence of 
national economic policies and the ECB’s monetary policy. Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2. Monetary and Fiscal Policy Conflicts in EMU 
2.1. A Model of a Monetary Union 
In this section, we develop a macroeconomic model of monetary and fiscal policy in a   
monetary union. All variables other than the rates of interest and inflation are defined in logs. 
The monetary union consists of two countries of equal size sharing a common currency. 
These two countries produce tradable output goods, Yi, I=1,2, which are imperfect 
substitutes in consumption. Aggregate demand at the monetary-union level depends on the 
real interest rate, i - π
e, and the aggregate primary government deficit measured relative to 
GDP, G, as well as an exogenous demand shock. We take the real primary government 
deficit at the national level, Gi, as the national policy instrument. The demand for money 
depends on the monetary-union price level, P, monetary union output, Y, the union-wide 
interest rate, and a money demand shock, u. Output supply in each country is determined by 
a short-run Lucas supply curve, where supply responds positively to unanticipated changes 
in the national output price.  t z1  and  t z2 are country-specific supply shocks. All shocks have 
zero mean, finite variance and are independent over time, and expectations are rational. For 
simplicity we assume that the two economies are symmetric in terms of the demand and 
supply elasticities. 
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1
γ
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Here, M denotes the nominal stock of money of the union at time t and is the policy 
instrument of the central bank. Pt = ½ (P1t + P2t) is the aggregate price level for the monetary  4
union. The rate of inflation is defined as   1 − − = t t t P P π . 
e
t P 1 +  is the expected price level in 
period t+1 with expectations based on information available at the end of period t, and 
e
it P  
the expected price of country i’s output price based on information available at the end of 
period t-1. The latter expectations reflect those of wage setters at the national level.
6 We 
define nominal aggregate output as  t t t t t t Y P Y P P Y 2 2 1 1 + + + = + .  
Equation (1) is the monetary union’s money demand function. Equation (2) is the 
union’s aggregate output demand function. The common interest rate, and the aggregate 
levels of prices and output of the monetary union are determined by the equilibrium in the 
money market and the combined output markets. By substituting (1) into (2) and aggregating 
the supply functions (3a,b), we derive the equilibrium levels of prices and output for the 
monetary union,  
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    (6) 
Accordingly, the current equilibrium price level depends on the sequence of all current and 
future money supplies and fiscal impulses. Price stability thus requires that these sequences 
converge. This provides a rationale for the numerical limits on government deficits and debt 
in EMU. 
  Closing the model, equation (7) determines the relative output demands between the 
two countries. To simplify the algebra, we assume that the fiscal impulses fall entirely on 
domestic output and that the demand for domestic output is a function of the relative price of 
                                                  
6 Alternatively, one might argue that wage setters use national consumption price levels instead of 
output prices as a basis for nominal wage demands. However, this would complicate the subsequent  5
the two goods. The relative price elasticity, α3 is a simple measure of the substitutability of 
the two goods.   
() () () ( ) ( ) [] t t t t t t t t t t t t t t v v P P G P G P P Y P P Y P 2 1 1 2 3 2 2 1 1 2
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Using (7), we can derive the equilibrium solutions for output and prices in country 1,  
 
 
() ( ) ( )( ) [] t t t t t t t t z z v v G G P P 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 − + − − + − + = γ α κ κ ,          (8) 






t t t z z z v v G G G G P P Y 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 0 1 1 ) ( + − + − − + − − − + − + = γ α κ κ α β β     (9)  
 
where  κ=1/(1+  α3 - α2 + α1  γ). Note that κ is small, if the two output goods are close 
substitutes, i.e., α3 is large. The solutions for country 2 are derived accordingly. 
These derivations indicate that the model embeds a hierarchy which is relevant for 
the analysis of monetary and fiscal policy. Specifically, monetary policy acts at the union 
level, where the interest rate and the price level are determined. Focusing on these 
variables, it is confronted with the aggregate fiscal stance, the sum of the two fiscal impulses. 
National output and prices, in contrast, are determined at the national level, and country-
specific shocks have no impact on the aggregate variables. Fiscal policy makers, therefore, 
face two tasks, namely to determine a policy stance appropriate at the aggregate level and to 
choose policies appropriate at the national level. As we shall see below, these tasks are 
generally only independent in the long run.    
 
1.2. Monetary and Fiscal Policies in the Long Run  
Consider, the long-run interaction of monetary and fiscal policy in this setting. As there are no 
surprises in the long run, the AS curve is vertical both at the national and the aggregate level. 
Figure 1A describes the situation. For expositional purposes, we take the past period’s price 
level as given and put the rate of inflation on the vertical axis. The two member states of the 
monetary union have symmetric AS and AD curves. The AS and AD curves for the monetary 
union, multiplied by ½ thus lie above the two national AS and AD curves.   
The important property of the long run in our context is that the central bank can 
choose the rate of inflation for the monetary union freely without affecting the level of output 
in neither country nor the monetary union as a whole. Given the central bank’s choice of the 
rate of inflation, a change in government spending in one country affects relative output 
                                                                                                                                                       
algebra with no important changes in the results.   6
prices and the distribution of output between the private and the public sector, but not the 
long-run level of output. Adverse supply-side policies in one country, such as a rise in 
distortionary taxes, shift that country’s AS curve inwards, and the aggregate AS curve for the 
monetary union with it. However, given the paths of expected fiscal impulses, the central 
bank can still maintain the same inflation rate by adjusting the monetary policy accordingly 
with no long-run consequences for output in the other country.   
The essence of this analysis is that monetary policy can achieve long-run price 
stability without interfering with fiscal policy, and the national governments can choose 
spending and taxes according to national preferences. Thus, beyond the imposition of an 
appropriate long-run constraint on government deficits, there is no need for coordinating 
monetary and fiscal policies. 
 
 
3. Monetary and Fiscal Policies in the Short Run 
3.1. A Graphical Exposition 
Consider now the short-run version of the model. In the short run, wages are sticky 
and unexpected changes in prices have real output effects. The aggregate supply curve is 
positively sloped.  
Again, the central bank can determine the equilibrium rate of inflation and, hence, the 
level of aggregate demand for the monetary union. Assume now that the government of the 
first country desires to increase output in its country and increases its deficit for that purpose. 
This drives up aggregate demand in this country and shifts the monetary union’s AD curve 
outwards. Responding to the incipient inflationary pressures, the central bank raises the 
interest rate, pushing the union’s AD curve back towards its initial position. As the interest rate 
rises, the national AD curves both shift inwards. In the new equilibrium, aggregate demand at 
the monetary union level is the same as before, but demand and output are higher in the first 
and lower in the second country; see figure 2A. 
Figure 1A Figure 1B
inflation
Y1, Y2, 1/2 Y
AD 1,2,EUR
AS 1,2,EUR
Y1, Y2, 1/2 Y
AD 1,2,EUR
AS 1,2,EUR 7
The point of the example is that the short-run model exhibits a conflict between 
monetary and fiscal policies in the monetary union. Given the positions of the supply curves, 
this conflict centers on the determination of aggregate demand in the monetary union and its 
distribution over the two countries.
7 It results from the fact that the monetary union’s inflation 
rate is determined together with its aggregate level of output in equilibrium. 
 
 
Figure 2A Figure 2B
inflation
Y1, Y2, 1/2 Y
AS 1,2,EUR AD 1,2,EUR
Y1, Y2, 1/2 Y
AS 1,2,EUR AD 1,2,EUR
AD EUR
AD' 1
AD' 2 AD' 1
AD' 2
 
There are two ways to frame this conflict. Assume, first, that the central bank is hard-
nosed on inflation and unwilling to tolerate any deviation of inflation from its target rate. As 
the central bank counteracts all variations in aggregate demand at the monetary union level, 
the aggregate AD curve becomes horizontal (fig. 2B). Fiscal policies at the national level are 
then in a pure distributional conflict, i.e., any increase in the deficit in one country crowds out 
demand in the other country. Suppose that output falls short of the governments’ target 
levels in the initial equilibrium. If the two governments fail to recognize this distributional 
conflict, they will increase government deficits in an effort to achieve their output goals. Since 
aggregate demand is controlled by the central bank, however, the fiscal expansions only lead 
to higher interest rates and eventually larger public debts, but neither government achieves 
its output goal. Coordinating fiscal policies is required to recognize the externality of fiscal 
policy and avoid inefficiently large deficits.   
The other way to frame this conflict is to assume that the central bank is willing to 
tolerate deviations of inflation from its target rate in the short run, i.e., the aggregate AD 
curve remains negatively sloped and can be shifted by monetary and fiscal policies. Fiscal 
policies in the two member states then have an impact on the level and distribution of output 
in the monetary union as well as on the rate of inflation in the short run. There are, thus, two 
problems to be solved at the same time, the determination of aggregate demand and inflation 
at the monetary union level and the distribution of output across the two countries. In the 
                                                  
7 For a strategic analysis of this conflict see Dixit and Lambertini (2000a,b).  8
absence of policy coordination, the governments and the central bank now compete in the 
determination of aggregate demand in the monetary union. If the governments pursue output 
targets exceeding the level of aggregate demand the central bank wishes to achieve, they 
will boost public deficits. Anticipating this, the central bank will tighten monetary policy more 
than it would otherwise. The result is an inefficient combination of tight monetary and loose 
fiscal conditions. Cooperative policies could achieve a better policy mix with lower interest 
rates and smaller deficits.  
 
Figure 2C Figure 2D
inflation
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Y 1:shock
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It is straightforward to extend this argument to the case of an exogenous shock to 
aggregate demand in the monetary union, such as a change in world demand for the output 
goods of the monetary union. Again, the central bank uses monetary policy to counteract the 
inflation effects of such shocks and thus determine the level of aggregate demand for the 
monetary union. Fiscal policies at the national level are reduced to determining the 
distribution of the shock over the two countries. Unless the governments recognize the 
situation, their reactions to demand shocks will be inefficiently large.   
Consider now the scenario where only the first country is hit by an exogenous 
demand shock (fig. 2C). On impact, this country’s AD curve shifts outwards and the 
monetary union’s AD curve moves with it. Faced with a rising inflation rate, the central bank 
responds by tightening monetary conditions, pulling the aggregate AD curve back. Assuming 
that the central bank is willing to tolerate some extra inflation, the aggregate AD curve will lie 
somewhat above the initial one; the first country’s AD curve will be to its right, the second 
country’s AD curve will be to its left. Monetary policy thus determines both the aggregate 
effect of the shock and its distribution over the two countries. The governments can obviously 
try to use fiscal policy to change the aggregate and the distributional outcomes, i.e., further 
shifts in the two curves may occur, before the monetary union settles down in a new 
equilibrium. An extreme version of this would be that fiscal policy in the first country absorbs 
the shock entirely. But it is far from clear that governments would agree to do this and  9
subject public policies in their countries to the risk of exogenous shocks. In general, 
therefore, a conflict between monetary and fiscal policy cannot be avoided in the short run.   
  
3.2. Strategic Interaction  
For a formal analysis of the short-run policy interaction, we express the model in 
terms deviations from expected values ( m g p y , , , ). Using  t t t t p g g g − = + 2 1  and setting β1  
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The objective functions for the central bank (CB) and the fiscal authorities (FA)  for country 1 
and 2 are assumed to be of the following form: 
 


























According to equation (10), the central bank seeks to stabilize the price level and the level of 
output around its long-run equilibrium value. For q=0, we say that the central bank is 
hardnosed about inflation. According to equation (11), the governments seek to stabilize 
domestic output around its long-run equilibrium value. They also wish to avoid deviations of 
domestic price developments from movements in the monetary union price level. This 
reflects a common argument in EMU, adopted officially at the Lisbon Summit, namely that 
fiscal policy should aim at minimizing such deviations. Finally, governments wish keep  10
variations in the fiscal impulse small. Minimizing the loss functions of the central bank and 
the two fiscal authorities (i) and (ii) with respect to their instrument variables,  2 1   ,   , g g m  










2 1 1 2 +
−
− − + − =
τ θ
ξ ρ ρ         ( 1 2 )  
 










m g n g f n
2






































































α κ ρ κ ρ
γ α









   (13) 
 




0 1 2 2 1 1
2 0








ρ γ α ξ ρ ρ
α κ ρ
   ( 1 4 )  
 
A solution similar to (13) holds for the fiscal impulse in country 2. From equation (12), we see 
that monetary policy reacts negatively to any fiscal expansion at the aggregate level as well 
as  to the demand shocks. Unless q is large, monetary policy’s reaction to supply shocks is 
positive to offset their effect on the price level. From (13), we see that each fiscal authority 
will react negatively to the monetary policy impulse. Thus, the effects of monetary and fiscal 
policies on aggregate demand partially offset each other. The interaction between the two 
fiscal policies is less straightforward. If the two output goods are close substitutes, (κ small), 
the second term in the brackets is likely to dominate and the fiscal impulse in country 1 will 
react negatively to a fiscal impulse from the other country. Otherwise, the term in brackets 
becomes positive and a fiscal impulse in the second country triggers a positive impulse in the 
first country. In that case, the two fiscal policies reinforce each other at the aggregate level.   
If fiscal policy follows the policy recommendation implied by the Broad Economic 
Policy Guidelines and focus on national price differentials alone, (n very large), it does not 
react to any aggregate shocks. However, the two fiscal authorities would be left fighting 
against each other’s impact on the national price levels. Letting n ⇒  ∞, we obtain the 
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which implies that an equilibrium exists only in the unlikely case that ε1 +  ε2 = 0. 
Solving for the monetary and fiscal variables yields the equilibrium policies at the 
monetary union level: 
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These solutions provide a number of interesting insights. First, with f = 0, a strategic 
equilibrium does not exist in the monetary union.
8 The reason is simple. If fiscal expansions 
are costless, each government fights for a larger share of aggregate demand to stabilize its 
national aggregates at the desired levels. Monetary policy, in turn, offsets the impact of the 
combined fiscal impulses. Note that the conflict between the two fiscal authorities arises 
although they share the same output target in the absence of any shocks.   
  This yields a second, suggestive interpretation for the fiscal strictures of the 
Maastricht Treaty, namely as an effort to make large fiscal impulses “costly” for the fiscal 
authorities. In this interpretation, the monitoring process and the public admonitions built into 
the Excessive Deficit Procedure create a political cost of fiscal impulses that increases with 
their size. To be effective, however, such a process requires timely and public warnings and 
reprimands against profligate fiscal policies. The recent experience with the warning letters 
the European Commission intended to issue against the governments of Germany and 
Portugal suggests that the governments are unwilling to tolerate such an open procedure. 
Furthermore, existence of an equilibrium demands that large negative fiscal impulses are 
costly, too. This is not foreseen in the Maastricht rules. 
  With f > 0, a strategic equilibrium exists. The equations then show that monetary 
policy alone counteracts the demand shock at the monetary union level. The aggregate fiscal 
stance only counteracts the supply shock. If demand shocks are more volatile than supply 
shocks, this implies that the more flexible policy instrument is used to address the shock with 
the larger variance.  
                                                  
8 This condition is mirrored in the setting of Buti et al. (2001), who introduced costs for smoothing 
interest rate to the loss function of the central bank. If the interest rate smoothing parameter is equal to 
zero, all demand side parameters dissapear from the solution.   12
When the central bank is hard nosed about inflation, q = 0, aggregate fiscal policy 
reacts negatively to the aggregate supply shock, as it tries to offset the effect on equilibrium 
output by boosting demand. At the same time, monetary policy reacts positively in an attempt 
to offset the inflationary consequences of the shock. Thus, fiscal policy and monetary policy 
work in opposite directions. In contrast, the fiscal policy reaction to supply shocks becomes 
more muted, if q >0, since monetary policy now assumes part of the effort to stabilize output 
at the monetary union level. In fact, assuming that θ+2τ>2, fiscal policy does not react to 
aggregate supply shocks at all, if q=1/2(θ+2τ-2). In this case, national fiscal policy focuses 
solely on national economic conditions with no reaction to aggregate shocks. Thus, the 
assignment of tasks envisioned in the Broad Economic Guidelines, whereby monetary policy 
is responsible for stabilization at the aggregate level and national fiscal policies focus entirely 
on idiosynchratic shocks at the national level, can be reached, if the central bank assumes 
some responsibility for aggregate output stabilization. 
 
3.3. Automatic Stabilizers 
It is now often argued in the EMU, that the issue of policy coordination can be solved 
by limiting fiscal policy to a core function, the operation of automatic stabilizers. According to 
this view, fiscal authorities should refrain from discretionary action and adopt a “steady hand” 
as Germany’s chancellor Schröder put it. A full use of automatic stabilizers would circumvent 
the strategic interaction between fiscal policies and these and monetary policy in EMU. In 
this section, we show that such a view has few if any merits. 
   A simple and straightforward way to model automatic stabilizers is to assume that 
the fiscal impulse is a function of real output. This embeds both the idea of automaticity of 
fiscal policy and the idea that policy makers cannot identify demand and supply shocks at the 
time when they occur and, therefore, are unable to implement optimal fiscal policies. Each 
government uses an automatic stabilizer of the formg1t = −λ1y1t, g2t =−λ2y2t . 
The policy problem at the monetary union level is now reduced to the optimal choice 
of a monetary policy given these automatic stabilizers. Optimal monetary policy then yields 
 
ρ2mt = ρ1 λ2 − λ1 () y2t +
τ −2qθ + ρ1λ1 2τ +θ ( )1+ 2q ( )
1+ 4q
zt −ξt      ( 1 7 )  
A first, important implication of automatic stabilizers is that optimal monetary policy is a 
function of output, hence of shocks at the national level unless the two countries select 
identical automatic stabilizers. Again to simplify, we let q = 0, i.e., the central bank is hard 
nosed about inflation. Given q = 0 and, hence, price stability, monetary policy still affects 
aggregate output, and aggregate output is affected by country-specific shocks, too. This  13
never occurs with optimal discretionary policies. A first implication of this is, therefore, that 
the restriction of fiscal policy to the use of automatic stabilizers can destabilize output at the 
union level. Note that this is true although there is no disagreement among the governments 
about the appropriate level of output that should be targeted. 
  Next, we insert the optimal monetary policy rule into the equilibrium solutions for 
output at the national level. This yields the equilibrium solutions for the two national outputs, 
 
() [] () ( ) ( ) [ ] t t t t z z v v y y 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 0 2 1 1 2 0 2 1 1 2 − + + + − + − = + + κ γ α φ κ α λ ρ κλ λ α κ ρ         (18a) 
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It is clear that the choices of optimal automatic stabilizers in the two countries remain fully 
interdependent. Even if the fiscal authorities are interested only in stabilizing domestic 
output, they will not choose fully offsetting stabilizers (λi = ∞), as the stabilizers also affect the 
transmission of shocks across countries and the impact of monetary impulses on the 
domestic economy. Note that, from equation (17), country 2 has an incentive to choose a 
value of λ2 > λ1, as doing so induces monetary policy to contribute to the stabilization of 
domestic output. As the country 1 has a similar incentive, the two countries to some extent 
compete for aggressiveness of automatic stabilizers due to the implied reaction of monetary 
policy.  In sum, the analysis shows that a focus on automatic stabilizers shifts the problem of 
policy coordination to a different level without eliminating it. 
 
3.4. Fiscal Policy Coordination 
The purpose of policy coordination is to develop a common fiscal stance among the 
member governments. Formally, this is achieved by minimizing a joint loss function for the 
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Minimizing (10’) and the loss function of the central bank with respect to the instrument 
variables,  g1,  g2, and m respectively, yields the following strategy for the coordinated 
aggregate fiscal policy: 
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Comparing the coefficients of fiscal and monetary policy at the monetary union level, we find 
that fiscal policy coordination reduces the optimal monetary policy reaction to aggregate 
supply shocks, if we assume that f is small and the following two relationships hold: 
() γ α α 3 1 2 2 1 2 + + <  and  ( ) γ α α α + + < 1 2 1 2 3 . For a larger values of f, the effect becomes 
ambigous.  Comparing the coefficients in (21) and (16), coordinated fiscal policies lead to a 
larger reaction to aggregate supply shocks than uncoordinated fiscal policies, if 

















        ( 2 2 )  
Note that κ - ρ > 0, unless the substitutability of the two output goods is too large. In this 
case, coordinated fiscal policies are more activist than uncoordinated fiscal policies, if the 
central bank is hard nosed about inflation (q=0). Since ρ0 < 1 under plausible assumptions 
about the parameters, coordinated fiscal policies are always more activist when the two 
output goods are very close substitutes, (κ ≈ 0).   
  
 
4. Policy Coordination in EMU 
 
4.1. Methods and principles of policy coordination 
Before EMU, policy coordination in the EU relied on two main methods, 
harmonization of policies based on common rules of behavior, and delegation to community 
institutions (Jacquet and Pisani-Ferry, 2000). EMU has expanded the scope of coordination 
under both methods. The conduct of the common monetary policy by the Eurosystem is an 
example for delegation. The fiscal strictures of the Excessive Deficit Procedure and the 
Stability and Growth Pact are examples for rules-based coordination in EMU. But in addition 
to these traditional methods, the Maastricht Process and the development of the union during  15
the 1990s also introduced new forms of coordination, which are based on dialogue, the 
exchange of information, peer pressure, and persuasion.  The reliance on “soft” enforcement, 
i.e., peer pressure and persuasion, indicates that the EU member states were unwilling to 
give up further sovereignty over their economic policies. The scope of policies covered by the 
existing coordination processes ranges from budgetary policies over labor market policies to 
regulatory policies at the national level.   
Policy coordination can have a narrow or a broad agenda. With a narrow agenda, 
coordination is limited to monitoring the national economic policies of the member states and 
challenging practices that are expected to worsen the quality of the EMU’s macro economic  
performance, e.g. with regard to price stability. The Excessive Deficit Procedure is an 
example for coordination under such a narrow agenda. Coordination with a narrow agenda 
leaves the member states the freedom to choose their policy goals, instruments, and 
methods of implementation. With a broad agenda, policy coordination goes beyond that and 
develops an explicit framework for cooperative policies. This requires agreement on a set of 
common policy goals and methods to achieve these goals. Apart from the single monetary 
policy and the administration of the Single Market, policy coordination in EMU today 
proceeds under a narrow agenda. 
Apart from the single monetary policy and the administration of the Single Market, 
policy coordination today also is of an “unconditional” nature in the sense that the 
participating member governments (and the ECB, where applicable) inform each other about 
what they intend to do given their expectations about future economic circumstances. What 
will happen, if these expectations fail to materialize, however, is not part of the various 
procedures. This limitation is particularly important in the context of coordination between 
monetary and fiscal policy in the EMU, where the key strategic issues involve the short run 
and development of transparent rules for reactions to shocks could greatly help guide private 
sector expectations.   
 
4.2. Actors 
  According to Article 99 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), member states 
coordinate their economic policies at the EU level within the Council of Ministers with the 
participation of all 15 member states and the presence of the European Commission and of 
the European Central Bank where deemed necessary. The Council of Economics and 
Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) is the relevant one for the discussion and decisions about 
government deficits, spending and taxation, while the Employment/Social Affairs Council 
deals with employment and social policies. In the coordination procedures established by the 
Treaty, the Council adopts economic policy guidelines and recommendations by majority  16
voting on a proposal from the Commission. There is also a host of ministerial committees 
working below the Council to prepare its work. 
In recognition of the specific coordination requirements among participants of the 
euro area, the 1997 European Council in Luxembourg established the Euro Group (also 
known as the Euro12-Group) of the finance ministers of the EMU member states. Since the 
Euro Group has no formal decision making authority and its role is limited to assessing the 
economic situation and discussing the major policy issues for the euro area. The group is 
chaired by a minister of a participating EMU member state holding the EU presidency, and, 
in periods when a non-EMU member holds the EU presidency, by a minister of the next EMU 
member state to hold the EU presidency. This subgroup of ECOFIN gathers in connection 
with ECOFIN meetings. 
The European Commission is present both at Council and Euro Group meetings. The 
Commission has the right to set the policy agenda for Council meetings and to provide 
analysis for multilateral surveillance. The Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) has 
advisory and preparatory functions for the Council meetings. It consists of representatives of 
the national administrations and the national central banks, as well as two representatives of 
the European Commission and the ECB. Within the limits set by the consensus agreements 
of the national governments, both institutions, the EFC and the European Commission have 
played leading roles in the development of the coordination process, e.g. by proposing and 
developing the various procedures reviewed below. While the European Commission and the 
EFC cover macroeconomic and financial issues, the Economic Policy Committee (EPC), 
which consists of officials from economics ministries, is primarily concerned with structural 
policies. 
Experience in the EMU and other contexts suggests that the responsiveness of 
governments to peer pressure is not the same in all countries. Large countries in particular 
are less likely to react to peer pressure in the desired way, as the wish to be a “good 
European” typically plays a much weaker role in their domestic politics than in smaller 
countries.
9 This is indicated by the observation that the share of EU initiatives in total 
legislative initiatives is usually smaller in the parliaments of large countries such as Germany, 
where 15-20% of all initiatives are due to implementation of EU initiatives (see von Beyme 
1997) than in smaller countries like Belgium, where it is around 50%. The slippage in fiscal 
discipline observed in 1999 – 2001 and the fact that France and Germany undertook 
significant tax measures without referring to them in their stability programs (European 
                                                  
9 It is interesting in this context to note that, during the convergence process to EMU in the 1990s, the 
small EU countries were much more responsive to the pressures for adjustment of budgetary policies 
than the large countries. See von Hagen, Hughes-Hallett and Strauch 2000.  17
Commission, 2000) also support the impression that the effectiveness of peer pressure to 
secure commitment of the large member states is limited.  
The effectiveness of recommendations made at the EU level to guide national 
budgetary policies is limited by several procedural impediments. Although the deadline for 
the submission of stability or convergence programs has been moved forward from 1 March 
to the end of preceding year, national budget processes and the writing of these programs 
run on different and loosely connected calendars. In many EMU member states, the budget 
and the stability program are prepared by different administrative units. Thus, the link 
between these processes is weak in many countries (Hallerberg, Strauch, von Hagen 2001). 
A further difficulty in this context is that the procedures for policy coordination do not always 
involve the relevant actors at the national level. This implies that negotiations at the EU level 
often lead to no more than statements of good intentions to persuade the other actors 
relevant at the national level.  
Article 113 forms the Treaty basis for a dialogue between the Council and the ECB. It 
foresees the participation of the ECB in Council meetings where matters relating to monetary 
policy are discussed. In turn, the Council president has the right to participate in meetings of 
the ECB Governing Council and to submit motions for deliberation by the Governing Council. 
But note that, since the president of the EU Council represents all members of the EU, he is 
not necessarily a good counterpart for the ECB to discuss the policy mix in the euro area. 
This is partly recognized by the practice that, if the EU presidency falls on a non-euro state, 
the Council president is represented by the chairman of the Euro Group, i.e. the finance 
minister from the next EMU member state to hold the EU presidency. The ECB president is 
always invited to participate in meetings of the Euro Group. 
The Cologne Process, an informal macroeconomic dialogue, was introduced under 
the German presidency in 1999. It consists of bi-annual, informal consultations between 
public authorities and representatives of the social partners without setting objectives. The 
social partners are represented by their respective organizations at the European level. The 
dialogue focuses on issues of monetary, fiscal and wage policies. The exchange takes place 
on a political and technical level between the ECB, ECOFIN, the Labor and Social Affairs 
Councils, the Commission, and the social partners. 
Although the dialogue explicitly recognizes the necessity of wage policies at the 
national level to be consistent with price stability in EMU, the forum is unlikely to play a major 
role in the coordination process. This is due to the fact that the EU federations of trade 
unions and employers unions do not have the authority to represent common views of their 
respective partners in all member countries and, therefore, cannot assure the enforcement of 
any agreements on guidelines for wage policies at the national level. This, in turn, is due to  18





4.3. Processes for macroeconomic policy coordination 
Table 1 presents processes of economic policy coordination in the EU. They include 
the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs, the process of multilateral surveillance, the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure and the Stability and Growth Pact and the Cologne Process. 
Finally, the open method of coordination, introduced at the Lisbon Summit, aims at 
coordinating the coordination processes with respect to EU goals. The last method is not an 
additional process alongside with the others but a concept of how to link the existing 
procedures. Its task is to exploit the fact that the processes are interacting with respect to 
policy goals such as employment and growth.  
According to Article 99 of the TEU, the BEPGs form the center of economic policy 
coordination process at the community level. The BEPGs consolidate the different existing 
processes (Luxembourg, Cologne and Cardiff) and aim at exploiting the synergies between 
them. BEPGs also form the reference for the multilateral surveillance procedure, under which 
the consistency of national economic policies with the BEPGs and the functioning of EMU in 
general are monitored. The multilateral surveillance procedure includes the possibility to 
make confidential or public assessments of the policies of individual member states and to 
give confidential or public recommendations to their governments. The European Council 
decides by unanimity vote on the BEPGs upon proposals by the European Commission and 
recommendations by ECOFIN. Since 2001, an enhanced framework for preparing and 
monitoring the implementation of the BEPGs is used that includes explicitly different decision 
making levels and actors at national and EU level in order to strengthen responsibility for 
final implementation. 
The difference between the EU and EMU matters particularly in this context. The 
BEPGs do not distinguish sufficiently between economic goods shared among all EU 
members, such as the Single Market, and those shared only among the members of the euro 
area, such as price stability in the EMU. At the level of the EU, the Internal Market constitutes 
the reference point for policy coordination. As in pre-EMU times, the coordination of 
economic policies assures that countries do not engage in policies that undermine the 
smooth functioning of open markets – competitive devaluations being the traditional 
example. The euro area, however, has a broader need for policy coordination.  
                                                  
10 Wyplosz (1999) argues that further centralization at EU level is also hindered by the diverging labor 
costs throughout Europe where in Germany labor costs are five times larger than in Portugal.  19
Fiscal policy remains a national competence for EMU member states, but under 
several constraints. EU Procedures for the conduct of fiscal policy are the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure, the Mutual Surveillance Procedure (Articles 99, 100, 111 TEU) and the Stability 
and Growth Pact (Regulations 1466/97, 1467/97, 97/C236/01-02). The No-Bail-Out-Rule 
(Articles 103 TEU, Article 21 ESCB Protocol) protects member states from becoming 
responsible for financial liabilities of other member states against their will. The Excessive 
Deficit Procedure includes the mandate (Article 3 of the Protocol) that the member states of 
EMU should implement appropriate institutions at the national level that enable them to fulfill 
their obligation for maintaining sustainable finances. In contrast to the obligation for all 
member states to have independent central banks, there is, however, no explanation of what 
this obligation means in practice. For members of the EMU, the Excessive Deficit Procedure 
is an unconditional obligation to avoid excessive deficits. In addition, the Stability and Growth 
Pact calls for medium-term budgetary positions close to balance or in surplus. The higher the 
debt-to-GDP ratio of a country, the greater must be its efforts to reduce it rapidly. Member 
states are required to take immediate corrective actions, if they are found to have an 
excessive deficit. The Excessive Deficit Procedure and the Stability and Growth Pact allow 
for the imposition of financial sanctions in such cases – a feature that distinguishes them 
from other coordination procedures.  
In the context of the Stability and Growth Pact, the EMU members are required to 
produce annual stability programs that present the main fiscal decisions and budgetary 
choices on the path to the medium term objective for budgetary positions close to balance or 
in surplus (2001-2004 for the latest programs). The Council considers whether the budget-
policy strategy and the economic targets continue to meet the requirements of the Stability 
and Growth Pact and the BEPG. In order to prevent the occurrence of excessive deficits, the 
Council may give an early warning in line with Article 99(4) of the Treaty. 
While the combined Excessive Deficit Procedure and Stability and Growth Pact 
acknowledge the importance of fiscal discipline for the conduct of monetary policy, the setup 
is still unsatisfactory with respect to the EMU for several reasons.  First, the procedures 
focus on individual member country performance with no regard to the aggregate fiscal policy 
stance of the euro area as a whole. Implicitly, the setup is based on the assumption that 
being close to balance is unconditionally the proper contribution of fiscal policy to 
macroeconomic stability in the euro area. While this may be true in the long run, our analysis 
in section 3 showed that stability demands different constellations of monetary and fiscal 
policy at different stages of the business cycle. 
Second, the procedure focuses narrowly on deficits and debts. In our context of policy 
coordination, the emphasis of the Excessive Deficit Procedure and the Stability and Growth 
Pact on government borrowing is justified only if one assumes that national fiscal policies  20
affect the macroeconomic performance of EMU and cause horizontal spill-overs 
predominantly through their capital market effects.   
Within the existing framework for policy coordination, the place for formulating and 
monitoring the achievement of such objectives would be the BEPGs. Other processes such 
as the Excessive Deficit Procedure and the Stability and Growth Pact as well as the Cardiff 
and Luxembourg processes described below are to provide detailed analysis of the 
respective policy areas. It is interesting, therefore, to note that the Commission’s and the 
Council’s 2001 recommendations for more fiscal discipline in Ireland were made under 
Article 99.4 (BEPGs), although the analysis was made in the context of the stability and 
Growth Pact (Fisher and Reitano, 2001). Thus, there seems to be some recognition of the 
incompleteness of the framework for fiscal policy coordination provided by the Excessive 
Deficit Procedure and the Stability and Growth Pact. But the weaknesses of the BEPGs for 
policy coordination in the EMU context also suggest that the potential for using them for the 
purposes indicated above remains limited. 
Table 1: Annual EU Procedures and actors involved   
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The current procedures for cooperative policies are unsatisfactory in two respects: 
First, they do not make sufficient room for formulating trade-offs nor for making the relevant 
choices at the aggregate level. This implies that no mechanism for expressing preferences 
over the aggregate policy stance is in place.  On the one hand, the processes are rather 
compartmentalized in terms of policy fields, while the analysis and evaluation of trade-offs 
requires dealing with more than one field of policy at a time. On the other hand, such an 
analysis and discussion currently only happens in the context of the BEPGs. Yet, the 
specificity of the BEPGs and the analysis surrounding them generally seems rather low. 
Secondly, there exists no proper mechanism for addressing the short-run fiscal policy 
conflicts in the monetary union. For reasons stated above, the EU Council, the relevant 
decision making body in this context, does not seem to be the appropriate body for a detailed 
assessment of trade-offs and policy choices for the euro area.  
With the creation of EMU, the governments have chosen to ignore the short-run 
interaction between monetary and fiscal policies and the interactions between fiscal policies. 
A framework for cooperative policymaking among the ECB and the national governments 
has not yet been developed. Instead, the current setup of the EMU seems to rely on the 
assumption that economic policy in the euro area can be separated into the different fields 
covered by the various processes and that interdependencies between these fields are 
negligible (Padoa Schioppa,1999). In section 2, we saw that such a separability between 
policies holds only in the long run. In the short run, a conflict potential exists between fiscal 
and monetary policy together with a distributional conflict between the national policies. 
11 
These conflicts have not been addressed so far in existing procedures and a coherent 




We have discussed the interactions and potential conflicts between monetary policy 
and the national fiscal policies in EMU. The analysis shows that in the long run, monetary 
policy can achieve price stability without interfering with fiscal policies. The central bank may 
choose the rate of inflation for the monetary union without affecting output in the individual 
member countries nor in the union as a whole. But, in the short run, there is a potential 
                                                  
11 The existence of such a conflict potential  was recognized by the Luxembourg Council in 1997 
which concluded that “…To the extent that national economic developments have an impact on 
inflation prospects in the euro area, they will influence monetary conditions in that area. It is for this 
basic reason that the move to a single currency will require closer community surveillance and 
coordination of economic policies among euro area member states.”   22
conflict between monetary and fiscal policies, as both interact in the determination of 
aggregate demand in the monetary union.  If the central bank firmly targets price stability, 
fiscal policy at the national level results in a pure distributional conflict. Governments fight for 
a larger share of aggregate demand to achieve their desired output levels while the central 
bank offsets the combined fiscal impulses. If fiscal impulses are costly, a strategic equilibrium 
exists where the central bank counteracts demand shocks at the union level and the 
aggregate fiscal stance only counteracts supply shocks.   
If the central bank tolerates deviations from price stability in the short run, fiscal and 
monetary policies are fully interdependent at the aggregate level. Since each of the 
authorities affects the others’ objectives, policy coordination among them improves the 
outcomes for all three of them. Ignoring the interdependencies between monetary and fiscal 
policies in the short run risks an  unsatisfactory macroeconomic performance of the monetary 
union.   
Our analysis suggests that limiting the fiscal policy to the operation of automatic 
stabilizers does not solve the issue of policy coordination. Instead it destabilizes aggregate 
output and implies that countries will compete for the aggressiveness of their optimal 
automatic stabilizers due to the implied monetary reaction. 
Solutions to solve these short term conflicts requires agreements among member 
states on a joint fiscal policy stance at the aggregate level, reconciling the fiscal stance with 
the union’s monetary policy, and procedures to express and aggregate preferences over the 
output-inflation trade-off at the EMU level and to make choices consistent with these 
preferences.  The existing processes and mechanisms for policy coordination are inadequate 
for dealing cooperatively with the relevant conflicts at the EMU level. They are insufficiently 
focused on EMU macroeconomic variables, and they do not provide a framework for entering 
binding commitments among the governments and between them and the central bank.  
 Existing processes for policy coordination in EMU may perhaps provide a basis for 
expressing the distributional conflicts among the member states, for expressing concerns 
about policies in one country that could have negative effects on others through the EMU 
aggregates, and for peer pressure encouraging reforms. However, they provide no 
framework to analyze the relevant conflicts in detail nor to arrive at binding agreements 
among the governments assuring the consistency of their individual fiscal policies with their 
policy goals at the national and the aggregate level. Thus, the current institutional setup 
largely keeps the member states in a non-cooperative policy game. One implication is that 
the central bank is rightfully reluctant to engage in cooperative policymaking with the fiscal 
authorities, as it cannot count on the reliability of agreements it might enter into with the 
governments. Thus, the lack of commitment among the governments implies an inability to 
commit between the monetary and fiscal authorities.  23
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1. Summary of the paper 
 
The paper by von Hagen and Mundschenk investigates the interactions between fiscal 
policy and monetary policy in the European and Monetary Union (EMU). In particular, 
the paper looks at the interdependence of fiscal policy which is controlled by national 
governments and monetary policy controlled by the common European Central Bank 
(ECB).  
 
The main conclusions of the paper are as follows: (1) In the long run, the ECB can 
choose inflation independently of output in either member country and national fiscal 
authorities can choose spending and taxes according to national preferences. There is 
therefore no need to coordinate monetary and fiscal policies. (2) In the short run, conflicts 
between monetary and fiscal policies cannot be avoided. Individual fiscal authorities will 
not take externalities of their policies on other member states into account and will tend 
to run too loose fiscal policies, which implies a tight monetary stance by the ECB to 
counteract inflationary pressure. Non-coordination of fiscal policies is therefore 
inefficient. The paper also shows that automatic fiscal stabilizers can lead to 
destabilization of output at the union level. 
 
2. The Model  
 
The model in this paper consists essentially of the following three equations: 
 
(1)  t t t t t u i Y P M + − = − γ /  
(2)  ( ) t t t
e
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The aggregate money demand equation (1) determines money demand as function of 
aggregate income and price level, nominal interest rate and a money demand shock, u. 
The aggregate (union) demand (2) relates union output and price level to the nominal 
interest rate; the common demand shock is captured by v. Finally, individual (country-
sepcific) supply functions (3a,b) show the relationship between prices and output for each 
of the two countries country i=1,2. Each country can experience supply shocks, zi. The 
aggregate money supply is controlled by the ECB, whereas national primary deficits (G) 
are the policy instruments of national governments.    26




where ∆(xi) represents the difference of a variable x = x1-x2 
 
3. Long-Run Results and Issues 
 
Prices are assumed to be flexible in the long-run. Policy-makers therefore face a vertical 
supply curve in the long-run, both at the union level as well as at the national level. The 
ECB can therefore freely choose inflation for the monetary union without affecting 
output. Fiscal policy choices of the member countries will determine the relative output 
prices and the relative size of the government sector, but not aggregate output.  
 
The authors assume that future money supplies and fiscal impulses converge according to 
equation (6) to determine the expected price level, P
e. This issue of price stability is 
related to the literature on the “Fiscal Theory of the Price Level” (see for example 
Cochrane 2002). The authors argue that this might provide a rationale for numerical 
limits on government deficits and debt in EMU. Other problems that might arise in the 
long-run could be debt and banking crises such as recently experienced by Argentina. For 
a recent discussion of these issues see Uhlig (2002). 
 
4. Setup of Short-Run Model 
 
In the short-run, there are nominal rigidities and unexpected price changes have real 
effects. The model equations (4’ to 9’) are expressed in terms of deviations from 
expected values for output, prices, fiscal deficits and the money supply.  
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where q measures the relative weight that the ECB gives to output stabilization (the 
inverse of central bank conservativeness), and n measures the weight of fiscal authorities 
to relative price differences and f captures the cost that national governments face by 
expanding fiscal policy. Another parameter of interest is κ which measures how 
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5. Summary of Short-Run Results 
 
The model gives a rich set of results on the interaction between monetary and fiscal 
policies in the short run. The policies can be summarized as follows: 
 
ECB policy reactions 
The ECB reacts negatively to fiscal expansion and demand shocks at aggregate level and 
positively to supply shocks (unless q large) to offset effect on π. 
 
Policy reactions of Fiscal Authorities (FA) 
Governments react negatively to monetary policy impulse to offset the contractionary 
effect on national output. The interaction between fiscal authorities is negative if goods 
close substitutes (κ small). If n is large, national governments focus mostly on relative 
price differentials (pi-p) and will not respond to aggregate shocks. The authors relate this 
point to the advice given at the Lisbon summit. The paper also shows that the restriction 
of fiscal policies to automatic stabilizers can lead to unstable output at the union level. 
 
Strategic Interactions 
The paper argues that when countries face no cost of fiscal expansion (f = 0) then no 
strategic equilibrium exists. This is not too surprising since national governments would 
use infinite fiscal impulses to counteract the effect of monetary policies. A more 
interesting question would be what happens to the equilibrium if national governments 
differ with respect to the cost of fiscal impulses. This could have induced the German 
government to impose first the Maastricht criteria on potential entrants to EMU and later 
the Growth and Stability Pact on EMU member states. In the short run, there will of 
course always be the temptation to fudge any such criteria as one could witness at recent 
ECOFIN meetings. Also a closer link of the results to other literature on strategic 
interactions would be desirable (see Dixit 2001 and Dixit and Lambertini 2001). 
 
Monetary Policy 
If the ECB is “hard-nosed” about inflation (q=0), no coordination issue between the 
central bank and national governments arises; prices completely stabilized, and output 
fluctuates. However, national governments can still attempt to counteract the 
contractionary effect of monetary policy on their output level. There is still room for 
coordination of fiscal policies. When the ECB also cares about output variability (q > 0), 
fiscal and monetary policies are fully interdependent. 
 
6. Comments on Theory 
 
The paper makes presents a rich framework and contributes to the literature by discussing 
the interaction between fiscal and monetary policies when governments face different 
costs of using fiscal policy (f > 0) or different weights on relative price differentials (n > 
0). The paper sketches the behavior of the economy in the short and the long-run, but 
does not explain the medium-term adjustment or strategic analysis of repeated short-term 
issues.  
   28
Other interesting questions would be for example: Can fiscal authorities “learn” and 
anticipate the reaction of other governments or the central bank? Is the Nash equilibrium 
played by fiscal authorities, the only equilibrium in repeated games or can cooperation be 
sustained through punishment? Also a closer link of the model to other related literature 
(Beetsma and co-authors, Dixit 2001, Casella 1999) is needed. Finally, the paper does not 
address normative questions such as the optimal trade-off between independence and 
coordination. For an excellent recent paper on the broader issue of coordinating public in 
a currency area see Alesina et al (2002). 
 
7. Comments on Empirics 
 
The paper has a descriptive section 4 discussing the various policy actors in EMU. 
However, the paper leaves open the question how important strategic interactions and 
externalities are in practice? It would be interesting to use historical data, for example 
from the ERM since 1992 or from other monetary unions, to get an idea of the 
importance of these effects. Alternatively, the paper could provide dynamic simulations 
(impulse response functions of shocks and policy impulses) of such policy conflicts and 
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It is with great pleasure that I am called to comment on the paper “Fiscal and Mone-
tary Policy Coordination in EMU”, written by Professor von Hagen and Mrs Susanne 
Mundschenk. 
The purpose of the paper is to study the relationship and potential conflicts be-
tween a centralized monetary policy, with the primary objective of maintaining price 
stability, and decentralized fiscal policies in the European Monetary Union (EMU). 
The topic of the paper is both interesting and relevant, focusing on existing, i.e. newly 
created, externalities of national fiscal policies in a monetary union. The analyses, 
findings and conclusions contained therein provide useful insights into designing a 
welfare-enhancing institutional framework. 
The paper has been structured as follows. In the second section of the paper, 
the authors model the long-term relationship between monetary and fiscal policies in 
EMU. In the third section, the short-run interrelations are analysed. Here, the authors 
provide an analytical framework dealing with the strategic interactions between 
monetary and fiscal policies, consider the operation of automatic stabilizers and dis-
cuss a potential policy coordination which might prevent a sub-optimal policy result-
ing from strategic interactions. The fourth section sets out methods and principles of 
policy coordination in EMU, introduces those involved in policy coordination, ex-
plains the processes for macroeconomic coordination and provides an assessment of 
whether the current procedures for cooperative policies in EMU are conducive to co-
ordinating national policies. 
The main conclusion of the paper is that by ignoring interdependencies be-
tween monetary and fiscal policy in the short run, there is a risk that the macro-
economic performance of a monetary union will be negatively affected. To prevent a 
sub-optimal outcome, an institutional framework is required to secure an agreement of 
a joint fiscal policy stance, reconciling it with the union’s monetary policy. The au-
thors argue that existing processes and mechanisms for EMU policy coordination are 
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inadequate for dealing cooperatively with potential conflicts. In fact, current policy 
coordination processes and mechanisms in EMU prevent the central bank from engag-
ing in cooperative policy-making with fiscal authorities. 
In my view, the conclusions of the paper deserve further attention given their 
foundations in the field of institutional economics and game theory – a methodologi-
cal approach which appears highly suited to the analysis of the issues under review. It 
is also worth mentioning at this juncture that I found the concise review and analysis 
of existing mechanisms for policy coordination in EMU, based on the theoretical find-
ings, highly informative. In the following, I will confine myself to commenting on 
three issues. First, I will touch upon the implications that a stable demand for money 
would have on the analyses presented in this paper. Second, I would like to make a 
brief remark on the relationship between rational expectations and the effectiveness of 
monetary policy. And third, I would like to put forward a view that might inspire fur-
ther work in this interesting and important field of research. 
In the authors’ model, the expected equilibrium price level is, by construction, 
determined by the sequence of current and future money supplies and fiscal impulses. 
This finding provides a rationale for imposing numerical limits on government defi-
cits to secure price stability. The conclusion rests on the assumption that the demand 
for money is unstable. If, however, the demand for money were assumed to be stable, 
a fiscal policy induced change in output could not be held responsible for exerting in-
fluence on the expected equilibrium price level. The use of a stable demand for 
money trend, allowing for instabilities in the short term, might be compatible with the 
paper’s short- and long-run policy implications. However, such a stable trend implies 
an inherent tendency within the private sector to restore itself to equilibrium. This 
might shed a different light on the rationale for shock-absorbing monetary and fiscal 
policy intervention. Thus, it would be interesting to see if an extension of the analysis, 
assuming a stable demand for money trend, yields additional insights. (I am well 
aware of the heated debate about the stability of money demand. In EMU, however, 
which has been taken as a reference point in this paper, the demand function for M3 is 
considered to be trend stable. That said, it might be of particular interest to contrast 
the results and conclusions with an environment in which the demand for money is 
assumed to be trend stable.)   31
A more general remark I would like to make refers to the relationship between 
rational expectations (RE) and the effectiveness of monetary policy. In general, under 
RE, monetary policy will exert an impact on real output only if it either delivers “sur-
prise inflation” or prices can be assumed to be “sticky”. However, if market agents 
expect the central bank to influence the real economy through surprise inflation be-
cause prices are assumed to be sticky, it might be reasonable to expect that hitherto 
long-term contracts will be changed into flexible, i.e. short-term, contracts. That said, 
the existence of sticky prices in the short term may not necessarily indicate a system-
atic effectiveness of monetary policy under RE. In fact, it is this general line of 
thought that encourages caution regarding base recommendations made on the as-
sumption that monetary policy can exert a systematic impact on the real economy. 
In the paper, a distinction is drawn between short- and long-term implications 
of monetary and fiscal policy interactions. Assuming a new classical type of macro-
economy, however, it would seem that, when analysing the impact of monetary and 
fiscal policy actions, a distinction between anticipated and non-anticipated, rather than 
short- and long-run, policy changes should do justice to the theoretical framework 
chosen. Moreover, it appears the proposition that public authorities should have an in-
formation advantage over the private sector needs some discussion; it is actually the 
crucial element allowing monetary and fiscal policies to implement shock-absorbing 
measures which are not anticipated by market agents, thereby having an impact on the 
real economy. 
To conclude, a government’s deficit spending is traditionally modelled as a 
function of the state of the business cycle. However, experience in a number of coun-
tries suggests that governments’ deficit spending seems to depend heavily on eco-
political factors (such as, for instance, continuously subsidising particular interests) 
rather than on output gap considerations. That said, it would be interesting to see how 
a change in the underlying reasons for running fiscal deficits might change the opti-
mal institutional framework governing the relationship between fiscal and monetary 






The authors confuse international interdependence through the price mechanism (here: the 
common real interest rate) with Pareto-relevant externalities (p. 11, 21). International 
spillovers in efficient markets do not generate Pareto-relevant external effects unless policy 
makers pursue more targets than they have instruments. In a Mundellian assignment solution 
where each policy instrument is directed at one policy target according to comparative 
advantage, there is no need for coordination among policy makers – neither within a country 
(e.g., between monetary and fiscal policy) nor between countries (e.g., their budget deficits).
1 
  The assignment solution is also more efficient than CEPR-type coordination games for 
at least three reasons: 
1.  The assignment solution permits an efficient division of labour among policy makers. 
Each policy maker or institution is in charge of only one instrument and can specialize on 
its effectiveness with respect to one target variable. 
2.  The assignment solution permits effective democratic control. The citizens understand 
which policy maker is responsible for which target. Without clear responsibility, the 
causes of policy failures will remain obscure, and a corrective feedback will be lacking. 
3.  When each instrument is assigned to one domestic target according to comparative 
advantage, the policy makers of different countries will compete with each other 
("yardstick competition"). International policy competition extends the scope for 
comparison so that voters are in a better position to evaluate the performance of their 
governments (including central banks). By contrast, international policy coordination is 
equivalent to an international cartel of policy makers vis-à-vis their citizens. It aggravates 
the principal-agent problem of representative democracy. 
The two authors correctly emphasize that the European Central Bank can achieve price 
level stability regardless of any national budget deficits. It merely has to adjust the supply 
of money to the changes of money demand which are caused by the interest rate effects of 
government borrowing. They also rightly emphasize that, in the long run, the money 
supply changes do not affect the national outputs and that the national budget deficits 
merely determine the national shares of union output. It is true that, in this setting, the 
targets of budgetary policy makers may be simply incompatible with each other just as the  
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exchange rate targets of two central banks may be incompatible. It is also true that, in this 
case, it is impossible for all budgetary policy makers to achieve their targets 
independently. But the same is true when they negotiate with each other. They simply 
have to realize that they cannot achieve such international distributive targets. Each has to 
direct his instrument to the domestic target for which it has a comparative advantage, e.g., 
to the target of efficiently financing public investment. 
  In the short run, it is true, national fiscal policy shocks may raise domestic and union 
output, but a competitive assignment solution is still feasible and superior to a coordinated 
policy cartel. 
  I see a strong case for external limits on government budget deficits but it has nothing 
to do with monetary uion and the coordination of output targets. Governments incur 
excessive budget deficits because the debt will largely be serviced by future generations 
who cannot yet vote. There is a Pareto-relevant intergenerational externality which is not 
sufficiently internalized through the transfer motive of parents and children. A 
constitutional limit on budget deficits would be required but it may not be agreed by the 
living generations either. If, for some (false) reason, such limits can be agreed in an 
international treaty (Maastricht), this is very welcome. But there is no need for 
international coordination of monetary or fiscal policies.  
  Enforceable limits on budget deficits are also very useful in a strategy of reducing 
government expenditure with the help of prior tax cuts. The deficit limits increase the 
pressure to reduce expenditure. Indeed, the pressure is maximized by getting close to the 
limit. It is not desirable to stay far off the limit. 
  It is probably evident that I do not agree with the policy recommendations which the 
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